JOSE A. BERNAS,
Petitioner, -
versus - SOVEREIGN VENTURES, INC., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 142424
Present: *PUNO,
J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: July 21, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: |
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Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
September 14, 1999 Decision[1]
and the March 7, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
49466, entitled “Jose A. Bernas, petitioner versus Sovereign Ventures, Inc., respondent.”
Jose A. Bernas,
petitioner, is the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Sovereign Ventures, Inc., respondent, claims that the same property is also registered
in its name as shown by TCT Nos. N-138316, N-138317, N-138318, N-14190, N-145202, N-1452208, and
N-1452209, also issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City.
Since the same property is covered by
conflicting titles, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 78,
Acting on respondent’s petition, the
RTC, on
On March 5, 1996, petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion assailing the said Order on the ground that he was not notified
of the raffle of the case, in violation of the Supreme Court Circular No.
20-95, now contained in Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
During the hearing of petitioner’s
Omnibus Motion on
Petitioner submitted his memorandum
“without prejudice” to his earlier Omnibus Motion.
Subsequently, petitioner reviewed the
records of the case and failed to see any notice of raffle. But when he again examined the records after
two weeks, he found among the records the notice of raffle sent to him at the
Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon
and San Jose Law Offices, where he previously worked as an associate attorney.
On
On
On
On
Meanwhile, going
back to Civil Case No. Q-96-26433, on
On
Petitioner then filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
On
On
Hence, the instant
petition.
The sole issue for our resolution is
whether the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion,
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the Order directing the parties
to maintain the status quo prior to the filing of the complaint
and restraining them from causing the annotation of lis pendens on the titles of the subject
property.
Petitioner contends that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because he was not notified of
the raffle.
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit.
Administrative Circular No. 20-95,[2] on raffle of a complaint with an application
for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, has been
incorporated in Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. The provision now reads as follows:
(c) When an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint
or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in
the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event,
such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of
summons, together with a copy of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the
applicant’s affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the
However, where the summons could not be
served personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or the
adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is non-resident thereof, the requirement of
prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.
From the foregoing, it is clear that
the prerequisites for conducting a raffle when there is a prayer for temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction are: there must be a
notice of the raffle to the adverse party or the person to be enjoined; and the
raffle must be conducted in the latter’s presence. The Rule also provides that the notice shall
be preceded or accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse party or the
person to be enjoined.
The Court of Appeals found that
respondent complied with the Rule above-quoted, thus:
Contrary to the contention of herein
petitioner, the procedure as so provided by Circular No. 20-95 dated September
20, 1995 has been complied with by the public respondent judge considering that
as clearly shown by the records of Civil Case No. 96-26433, Volume I,
particularly pages 158-159 thereof, a notice of raffle dated February 5, 1996
was issued by the clerk of court addressed to the different defendants in that
case and one of these defendants is herein petitioner. And per Officer’s Return
dated
The notice of raffle and the notice of hearing as
required by SC Administrative Circular No. 20-95 are complied with. Records show that respondent Bernas was furnished a copy of the Notice of Raffle through
Glenda Jamora as shown by the Officer’s Return of the
Process Server Romulo C. Sanchez from the Office of
the Clerk of Court (pp. 158 and 160, Records).
The Notice of Hearing on the issuance of the preliminary injunction was
likewise duly served on the said respondent, as shown in the Sheriff’s Return
dated
Indeed, petitioner has no reason to
complain. The trial court sent the
notice of raffle to petitioner at his previous business address, the Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon and San Jose
Law Offices, and it was received by Glenda Jamora, a
receptionist there. The trial court
cannot be blamed for sending the notice to the said law firm because it was the
address stated in respondent’s petition for quieting of title.
Moreover, as held by the trial court,
petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the said
court. Records show that on
A court generally acquires
jurisdiction over a person through either a valid service of summons or the
person’s voluntary appearance in court.[3]
Let it be stressed at this point the
basic rule that when a motion to dismiss is denied by the trial court, the
remedy is not to file a petition for certiorari, but to appeal after a decision
has been rendered. In East Asia Traders, Inc. v. Republic,[4]
this Court held:
Petitioner
basically contends before the Court of Appeals that the RTC acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. CT-98-001.
The
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner with the Court of
Appeals is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the RTC of the motion
to dismiss. The Order of the RTC denying the motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory. An interlocutory
order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something
to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the court
and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time
before final judgment. This proceeds
from the court’s inherent power to control its process and orders so as to make
them conformable to law and justice. The
only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave abuse of discretion, or
that no injustice results thereby (Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA
322 (2001).
In
An order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision
has been rendered. A writ of certiorari
is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only
to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its
function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to
relieve persons from arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have no power
or authority in law to perform. It is
not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts.
As shown by the records, petitioner
has brought the same issue before this Court three times. He is, therefore, warned that, henceforth,
no similar petition shall be entertained.
In sum, we rule that the Court of
Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
49466.
WHEREFORE,
this Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49466.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* No part.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Demetrio G. Demetria (all retired).
[2] Paragraph 1 of Administrative Circular No. 20-95 reads: “1. Where an application for temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction is included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading filed with the trial court, such complaint or initiatory pleading filed with the trial court shall be raffled only after notice to the adverse party and in the presence of such party or counsel.”
[3] Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, cited in Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590,
[4] G.R. No. 152947,